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标题: KNLA谈得与失:如何在力量悬殊的状况下打痛缅军 [打印本页]

作者: 往事如烟 时间: 2016-6-15 13:32
标题: KNLA谈得与失:如何在力量悬殊的状况下打痛缅军
本帖最后由往事如烟于 2016-6-15 01:43 PM 编辑

一篇非常不错的KNLA抗缅战争总结，分析了克伦民族联盟半个世纪抗缅斗争之中的经验教训。KNU曾经是最强大的民族武装，90年代以前都控制着克伦泰国边境，有一定经济基础和战争来源，能够与缅军进行一定规模的交战，现KNLA总司令约翰尼当年就被称为无畏上将，是此种作战的代表人物。后来，缅军在90年代取得了一系列的胜利，使得KNU失去了与缅军进行大规模作战的能力，KNLA此后逐渐转型为特种作战，运动战，游击战，这种战争类型成本代价小，让缅军防不胜防，二十年时间，缅军在克伦损失伤亡数万。现KNLA副司令宝觉海是特种作战的代表人物。

KNLA的经验是，10个训练良好装备精良的战士，其战斗力要远胜于30名普通士兵。内容很多，值得一读，其它内容有兴趣自行阅读。

作者: 果军参谋 时间: 2016-6-15 14:36
给链接啊。。。

作者: 果军参谋 时间: 2016-6-15 14:37
链接呢。。。。

作者: 往事如烟 时间: 2016-6-15 14:47

果军参谋发表于 2016-6-15 02:36 PM
给链接啊。。。

什么链接？？？？

作者: 果军参谋 时间: 2016-6-15 15:14
How the Karen National Liberation Army can take on the Burma Tatmadaw with less resource and manpower

For most of its first forty years of sixty seven resistance history, roughly from 1949-1994, the Karen National Liberation Army had engaged in mass battles with the Burma Army with deadly results on both sides. Some of the prominent battles included Insein, Kaw Moo Ra, Maw Po Kay, Mae La, Yay Gyaw, Mae Ta Wor, Pa Lu, Twee Par Wee Gyo, Tee Moo Kee, Saw Hta, and Marner Plaw, the headquarters of the Karen National Union. Most of these battles were exhausting and resulted in high casualties on both sides because they involved the use of artillery and heavy weaponry and most last from weeks to months. In most cases, hundreds of thousands of combat personnel and civilians got involved to support the war effort.
Some of the prominent Karen military officers and generals have also gained military experience and made their names out of these major battles. For example, both of the current KNLA highest ranking officers, General Jonny and his deputy General Baw Kyaw Heh, are a product of past major battles. General Johnny, not so much a tactical officer but a fearless commander who dared to mass his troops in open fields in order to take enemy position, have fought in most major battles in Brigade 7th, such as Maw Po Kay, Mae La, Mae Ta Wor, Twee Pah Wee Gyo, Manner Plaw and several other battlefields throughout the 1970s-80s. His fighting experience involved mostly mobilizing large number of his troops to attack enemy outposts and would not retreat until he achieved his goal. As a result, he was mostly known among his troops and enemy soldiers as the fearless officer. Unlike General Jonny, General Baw Kyaw Heh was a graduate of the first KNLA’s Commando Battalion and was known to be more tactical in his approach to the battlefield. He had also fought in several heavy battles such as Manner Plaw, Tee Moo Kee, Saw Hta and several other places in Brigade 5th. His fighting experience mostly involved special operations to take enemy outposts by surprise and disrupt enemy supply lines and reinforcements.
But the days where KNLA can fight defensive battles with the Burma Army in mass battlefields are all gone, since the KNU has lost its major strongholds, including its headquarters, Manner Plaw, along with all the major unofficial border toll gates it controlled, in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During its heyday, KNLA could field thousands of troops and operated like a standing army. It could engage in battles with the Burma Army for prolong periods. But since 1994, following the breakup of the Karen political movement along religious line and the subsequent formation of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, KNLA’s strength has been vastly degraded and it being forced to adopt new tactics and resort to guerrilla warfare. Since the mid 1990s, a lack of revenues and frequent internal fragmentation has severely undermined the military wing of the KNU and made it impossible for the organization to recover its former military strength.
However, KNLA has also become more creative in its methods and techniques against the Burma Army despite losing its strongholds. In some respect, its guerrilla and hit-and-run tactics have been far more successful and cost effective than mass battles. It requires less resources and manpower to carry out operations. KNLA no longer needs to defend stationary bases that would usually drain financial resources and manpower. According to a KNLA record and estimate, thousands of government troops have been killed by the Karen rebels since the mid 1990s after guerrilla warfare technique was adopted. It is cost effective and successful. In March of 2009, a small unit of KNLA soldiers ambushed a Burma Army convoy and killed Brigadier General Kaung Myat, commander of the Military Operation Command No.( 5) based in Pegu Division and the highest government military officer the Karen rebels had ever killed in its 67 years war with the government. In August 2010, a combined unit of DKBA and KNLA soldiers also ambushed a government convoy that carried Lt. Gen Khin Zaw of the Ministry of Defense in Kawkareik Township and almost took him out. The ambush left four government soldiers dead with no casualties on the Karen rebels’ side.
Will guerrilla warfare technique be sustainable and successful in the long run against the government forces?
If past history is any indication, many armed movements that adopted guerilla warfare technique have seen success in their struggle against bigger and better equipped armies. Despite its superior man and fire power during the Vietnam war, Americans could not crushed a well-organized and disciplined Viet Cong guerrilla forces. During the Chinese civil war, a determined and disciplined guerrilla forces led by Mao Ze Dong was able to defeat the much bigger and well-funded and well-armed nationalist forces under General Chiang Kai-shek.
The lesson learned from Vietnam war and the Chinese civil war is that quality is more important than quantity. You don’t need a bigger army to defeat your opponents. But what you really need is an effective, well-trained, well-organized, and well-discipline force that is able to excuse plan and inflict maximum casualties on the enemy forces. This means that KNLA does not necessarily need bigger man power to take on the Burma Army on its own turf. What the KNLA needs is a small but well-trained, well-equipped, and disciplined group of freedom fighters to carry out hit-and-run military operations against the Burma Army throughout the Karen state, or at least in areas under KNU control.
To achieve efficiency and make use of the available scarce resources effectively, KNLA needs to focus on training more mobile special forces to launch surprise attacks on enemy bases and disrupt their supply lines. The theory is that it is better to have ten highly trained and well-equipped soldiers than having thirty poorly trained and under-equipped soldiers. Larger army means that you have to spend more resources to feed, clothe, and equip them and many times they are not effective and reliable in the battles. But having a smaller but highly trained, well-disciplined and determined army can save you resources and manpower. Special forces need to be trained in not only inflicting physical pain on the enemies, they can also inflict psychology pain. For example, in many parts of Brigade 5th, most Burma Army soldiers dare not travel outside of their bases and their senior officers spend most of their time inside the bunkers or secured zone for fear of being targeted by Karen snipers. The special forces need to also focus more on the big fish in their targets. If more senior officers in the Burma Army can be threatened and taken out, they will lose their psychological stamina.
The KNLA estimates that it has approximately 6000-7000 troops, of which only two third are active and most of them are regulars. This number is quite small in comparison to the Burma Army. However, if you can turn most of them into a highly trained guerrilla force and equip them with the right tools and weapons, they can be an effective army and do a better job than a ten thousand-strong regular army.
In sum, given that KNU has no steady income and lack the necessary resources to equip a large army like it did twenty years ago, its military wing KNLA needs to adopt new methods and improve training for its force in order to make use of the scarce resources available to them. It does not need a bigger army to take on the Tamadaw in mass battlefields; the KNLA needs small, highly mobile, and highly trained guerrilla forces to cause havocs and physical and psychological pain on the enemies while minimizing its own loss. It needs to improve its intelligence gathering and psychological warfare skill. It needs to prioritize on training more special forces and equip them with modern weapons and military tools. Their new training doctrine should be less is more, and bigger does not always mean better.

作者: 往事如烟 时间: 2016-6-15 15:33

果军参谋发表于 2016-6-15 03:14 PM
How the Karen National Liberation Army can take on the Burma Tatmadaw with less resource and manpowe ...

这是什么东东？？？？

作者: 同根相怜 时间: 2016-6-15 15:58
本帖最后由同根相怜于 2016-6-15 04:00 PM 编辑

往事如烟发表于 2016-6-15 03:33 PM
这是什么东东？？？？

克伦民族解放军如何的缅甸武装部队用更少的资源和人力
六十七年首次四十年的大部分时间里抵抗的历史,大约从1949年到1994年,克伦民族解放军与缅甸军队从事质量与双方的致命的结果。一些著名战役包括永盛,乌鸦的叫声Ra,胃宝凯,美拉,耶敏,梅塔磨破,Pa,故作多情的小Gyo,三通Moo凯,看见Hta和马南Plaw,克伦民族联盟的总部。大部分的战斗耗尽,导致双方的高伤亡,因为他们涉及使用大炮和重型武器和大多数持续几周到几个月。在大多数情况下,成千上万的作战人员和平民介入支持战争。
一些著名的凯伦军官和将军们也获得了军事经验,他们的名字的重大战役。例如,当前KNLA排名最高的军官,一般乔尼和他的副手一般弯曲觉嘿,是过去的主要斗争的产物。一般约翰尼,与其说战术官但无畏的指挥官敢于开放领域的大规模军队,以敌人的位置,已经打了在大多数主要战斗旅7日,如胃Po凯,梅,梅塔磨破,矫饰的Pah Gyo,Plaw方式和其他几个战场在1970年代- 80年代。他的战斗经验涉及主要动员大量的他的军队攻击敌人的前哨,不会后退,直到他实现了他的目标。结果,他主要是在他的军队和敌军士兵被称为无所畏惧的官。不像一般乔尼,通用弯曲觉哈是毕业于第一KNLA突击营,被更多的战术方法战场。他还在等重型战斗方式Plaw,三通Moo凯,看见Hta和其他几个地方旅5日。他的战斗经验主要涉及特种作战的敌人前哨大吃一惊,破坏敌人的补给线,增援部队。
但KNLA可以与缅甸军队质量展开防御战役战场都消失了,克伦民族联盟以来已经失去了它的主要据点,包括总部、态度Plaw,连同所有主要的非官方控制边境收费站,在1980年代末和1990年代初。在其鼎盛时期,KNLA领域成千上万的军队和运营常备军。可以从事与缅甸军队延长时间。但自1994年以来,分手后凯伦沿着宗教政治运动线和随后形成的民主克伦佛教军,KNLA的实力已经大大退化,它被迫采取新的策略和采取游击战。自1990年代中期以来,缺乏收入和频繁的内部分化严重削弱了军事派别的克伦民族联盟组织,使它不可能恢复昔日的军事力量。
然而,KNLA也变得更有创造性的方法和技术对缅甸军队尽管失去其据点。在某些方面,它的游击队和打了就跑的战术更成功的和成本有效的大规模战斗。它需要更少的资源和人力来进行操作。KNLA不再需要捍卫固定基地,通常会耗尽财力和人力。据KNLA记录和估计,成千上万的政府军队已经被1990年代中期以来的卡伦族反政府武装游击战争后技术被采用。它是成本效益和成功。2009年3月,一个小单位KNLA士兵埋伏袭击了缅甸军队护航,并且杀害了准将Kaung Myat,军事行动的指挥官的命令。(5)位于勃部门和最高政府军官卡伦族反政府武装曾在67年的战争中丧生的政府。2010年8月,结合单位的克伦民主佛教军和KNLA士兵也伏击了一幅有关哈米德•古尔中将政府车队进行钦Zaw Kawkareik国防部的乡,几乎把他。伏击造成四名政府士兵死亡,没有伤亡凯伦叛军的一侧。
游击战争技术将可持续发展和成功的从长远来看反对政府的力量?
如果过去的历史是任何指示,许多武装运动,采用游击战争技术已成功在他们的斗争更大更好的装备军队。尽管其优越的男人和火力在越南战争期间,美国人不可能被越共游击队的那样组织严密、纪律。在中国内战,决心和自律游击部队由毛泽东能够击败的规模更大,资金雄厚,装备精良的国民党军队在蒋介石。
越南战争的教训,中国内战,质量比数量更重要。你不需要一个更大的军队击败你的对手。但你真正需要的是一个有效的,训练有素,组织良好,well-discipline力量能够原谅计划和对敌军造成最大伤亡。这意味着KNLA不一定需要更大的人力去缅甸军队在自己的地盘。KNLA需要的是一个小但是训练有素,装备精良,和训练有素的群自由战士开展肇事逃逸在克伦邦与缅甸军队的军事行动,或者至少在克伦民族联盟控制领域。
实现效率和有效地利用可用的稀缺资源,KNLA需要关注培训更多移动特种部队发动突袭敌人的基地和干扰他们的补给线。理论是,最好是有十个训练有素,装备精良的士兵比三十缺乏训练和装备士兵。大军队意味着你必须花更多的资源来养活,衣服,和装备他们,很多时候他们不是战争的有效和可靠的。但是有一个小但是训练有素,有节制的和确定的军队可以节省资源和人力。特种部队需要训练不仅造成身体疼痛的敌人,他们也可以造成心理痛苦。例如,在许多地方旅5日以外的大多数缅甸士兵不敢旅游基地和高级官员的大部分时间都花在掩体或安全地带,由于害怕被凯伦狙击手的目标。特种部队也需要更加关注大鱼的目标。如果更多的缅甸军队的高级官员可以威胁了,他们将失去他们的心理耐力。
KNLA估计有大约6000 - 7000名士兵,其中只有两个第三是活跃的,它们中的大多数都是常客。这个数字是缅甸军队相比很小。然而,如果你能把他们中的大多数变成一个训练有素的游击武装力量,配备适当的工具和武器,他们可以成为一个有效的军队和做得更好比一百一十的强悍正规军。
总之,考虑到克伦民族联盟没有稳定的收入,缺乏必要的资源来装备大量军队像二十年前那样,其军事力量KNLA需要采用新方法和提高训练的部队为了利用稀缺资源。它不需要一个更大的军方重组大规模战场,但是军政府军队承担KNLA需求小,高度移动,和训练有素的游击部队对敌人造成破坏和生理和心理痛苦而减少自己的损失。它需要改善其情报收集和心理战的技能。它需要优先培养更多的特种部队和配备现代武器和军事手段。他们的新训练原则应该少即是多,更大并不总是意味着更好。

作者: 往事如烟 时间: 2016-6-15 16:18

同根相怜发表于 2016-6-15 03:58 PM
克伦民族解放军如何的缅甸武装部队用更少的资源和人力
六十七年首次四十年的大部分时间里抵抗的历史,大 ...

翻译出来的。

作者: 同根相怜 时间: 2016-6-15 16:34

往事如烟发表于 2016-6-15 04:18 PM
翻译出来的。

用“有道”在线翻译出来的，里面有多处驴唇不对马嘴的地方，凑合着看吧。

作者: 往事如烟 时间: 2016-6-16 14:37

同根相怜发表于 2016-6-15 04:34 PM
用“有道”在线翻译出来的，里面有多处驴唇不对马嘴的地方，凑合着看吧。

原来是这样。

作者: 在野孤鸿 时间: 2016-6-16 14:42
也只能是打痛对方而已，无法打残或者是打死。

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