以佤邦联合军的视角看待缅甸和平进程

三民主义

Understanding the UWSA’s perspective on the peace process

以佤邦联合军的视角看待缅甸和平进程

刘蕴

Myanmar’s peace process, the signature policy of the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, has been running into an extremely strong, if not fatal, headwind caused by a three-day Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) summit ended on February 24 in Pangkham, the headquarter of the 30,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA) which is Myanmar’s largest non-state military group.

作为国务资政昂山素季的标志性政策，缅甸和平进程遇到了阻力。这个阻力即使不致命，也是相当巨大的，它来自2月24日结束的民地武邦康峰会。邦康是缅甸最大的非政府武装、拥有3万兵力的佤邦联合军的总部。

Observers have worried the inherent precariousness of the UWSA’s opposition to the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA). In addition to firing a salvo of criticism at the peace process, the UWSA has also put itself forward to head a political negotiation team that consist of non-signatory EAOs, aiming to hold formal talks about ceasefire and political issues with the central government and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces).

观察家们对于佤邦联合军反对《全国停火协议》的立场感到担忧。佤邦联合军不仅猛烈批评和平进程，而且领导未签约民地武成立了一个政治谈判小组，目的是与中央政府和国防军就停火和政治问题进行正式谈判。

This article is to provide a fresh and practical framework for reading into the UWSA’s position on the peace process as well as for clarifying the manner in which the UWSA responses to evolving conditions .

本文将针对佤邦联合军在和平进程中的立场提出一个全新而又务实的认识框架，同时就佤邦联合军在变化局势中的反应方式做出澄清。

UWSA’s basic position on NCA佤邦联合军针对《全国停火协议》的基本立场

In his opening speech for the EAOs summit, UWSA’s Commander-in-Chief Bao Youxiang criticized the NCA as saying “the ethnic fighting happening today is heavier than ever. Conflicts in Kachin State and northern Shan State along the Myanmar-China border is getting worse day by day. The NCA being discussed between some EAOs and Myanmar's government has brought no solution to that,” he further pointed out “EAOs have been divided into three groups: NCA signatories, NCA non-signatories as well as those sticking to the Three-Level Peace Agreement. We have to adopt better strategies for political dialogue with the government. ”

佤邦联合军总司令鲍有祥在邦康峰会中发表讲话，他批评《全国停火协议》，认为：“鉴于目前民族矛盾比任何时期都更加激烈，特别是缅北缅中边境的克钦邦和掸邦北部地区，内战也愈演愈烈，部分少数民族组织与缅方正在进行的NCA谈判，至今无结果，大规模的内战从没有因NCA的谈判而停止。”鲍有祥继续指出：“一份NCA，将各民族组织事实上划分成了三个阵营，一个是已经签了NCA的，一个是草签了NCA但在正式签署前要求再次修改的，一个是坚持《三级和平协议》的。在这次峰会上，这个NCA的问题没法回避，三方之间如何协调立场是必须要解决的。”

On the one hand, The UWSA considers that the Myanmar government is pursuing its own political purposes, not just ceasefire literally, by endorsing the NCA as a replacement of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, a federalism formula signed by Genaral Aung San and ethnic leaders However, the NCA terms neither thoroughly describes the “Panglong Spirit” nor make clear the definitions of political terms, such as democracy, equality, freedom, self-determination, and federalism. This oversight allowed successive governments to take advantage of the EAOs.

一方面，佤邦联合军认为缅甸政府出于政治目的，而不只是“停火”本身，试图以《全国停火协议》替代1947《彬龙协议》。彬龙协议是昂山将军与少数民族领导人共同签署的。但是，《全国停火协议》的条文既没有详细描述“彬龙精神”，也没有对一些政治术语给出明确定义，比如民主、平等、自由、自决权以及民族联邦制。缅甸政府在与民地武历次谈判中都利用了这些漏洞。

On the other hand, the UWSA leadership has little faith that Naypyidaw would strictly comply with any agreement with EAOs, and strongly demanded the involvement of the United Nations and China as arbitrators in the peace process. China, for its own sake, does not wish to see a conflict, or even occasional skirmish, between the UWSA and the government.

另一方面，佤邦联合军领导人对于内比都能否严格执行与民地武的协议没有信心，并强烈要求联合国和中国成为和平进程的仲裁方。中国出于自身利益，不希望看到佤邦联合军与缅政府爆发冲突，甚至连小摩擦也不愿意看到。

How does the UWSA view the escalation of conflicts?佤邦联合军如何看待冲突升级

The UWSA has reviewed recent escalation of conflicts in historical context that discussions between EAOs and successive governments since the National Convention in 1993 were confusing and unproductive, and the disputes between the government and the EAOs could not be solved and that civil war could not be stopped, either by the military regimes or the latest civilian government. As a conclusion, the UWSA put the blame squarely on the Tatmadaw whose non-stop offensives have made ethnic people suffer severely for 70 years.

佤邦联合军将目前的冲突放在历史背景中进行审视。从1993年开启的国民制宪大会到今天的各种谈判，林林总总眼花缭乱，不管是军政府时期，还是2011年后的联邦政府时期，不管是协商，还是谈判，还是军事，但始终都没能解决民族矛盾，内战始终不能停止，问题至今都未能解决。作为结论，佤邦联合军认为70年来缅军不断发动战争，少数民族人民深受苦难。

The Tatmadaw’s unprecedented military pressure over the other EAOs has arouse UWSA’s deep concerns regarding its own security scenarios. One of the Panghkam summit participants, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has lost five outposts within two months in the early 2017, leading to growing fear that its headquarter Laiza could eventually be taken by the Tatmadaw with huge advantage in both weaponry and manpower.

缅甸国防军向其他民地武施加前所未有的军事压力，这使得佤邦联合军深度考量自身的安全形势。邦康峰会成员之一克钦独立军在2017年初的两个月内丢失了5处重要据点，有关其总部拉咱将最终落入缅军手中的担忧不断增长。缅军不论在武力还是在兵力上都占有绝对优势。

Rubber hits the road开始行动

The UWSA usually steer clear of ethnic politics. Since 1989 the Wa has been enjoying an unparalleled autonomy from the central government. Presumably, the UWSA is content with the status quo of a de facto “ethnic state” with successful businesses and institutions, benefiting from the rapid development of China while being part of Myanmar not to be bound by stringent Chinese laws and regulations.

佤邦联合军一般不参与缅甸的国内政治。1989年以来，佤邦从中央政府获得极大的自治权。可以想见，佤邦联合军乐于保持目前的状态，作为事实上的“民族邦”，在经济和体制建设上都获得了成功。佤邦作为缅甸的一部分从中国的迅猛发展中获益巨大，同时也不受中国相对严苛的法律法规的限制。

The improvement in China-Myanmar relationship after NLD government taking office in April 2016 has pressured the UWSA to take part, reluctantly of course, in the peace process which inevitably requires political and economic compromises from all sides. In this manner, the UWSA’s low level delegation understandably walked out of the ongoing 21st Panglong conference in September 2016, decrying inequality in discussions, while conference organizers admitted mismanagement.

民盟政府2016年4月执政以来，中缅关系取得进展。佤邦联合军在压力下参与缅甸和平进程，当然会表现出犹豫。和平进程最终将要求所有参与者在政治和经济上做出妥协。于是可以理解2016年9月佤邦低级别代表团中途退出了21世纪彬龙会议，原因是受到不公平待遇，会议组织方也承认了安排方面的失误。

Any forced arrangement would be fragile and unsustainable. Therefore, this article argues for optimistic attitude towards the UWSA’s assertive position which has surprised many observers and politicians but actually indicates that its aging leaders, who seem to be Old Guards enveloped by a number of revolutionary ideologies, has prepared to be capable of compromising and changing policies in line with evolving conditions in and outside Myanmar.

强扭的瓜不甜。因此，本文认为应该对于佤邦联合军的主动立场持有乐观态度，这种立场虽然让不少观察家和官员吃惊，但是表明了佤邦年迈的领导层已经准备好与时俱进改变策略并为适时做出妥协留有策略空间。--长沙翰悦发布