美帝专家:印度把缅甸的锅给砸了

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这是一个美帝亚洲问题专家的评论，他针对前段时间印度越境到缅甸打击反印武装的行动提出了自己的观点，他认为印度的行为是愚蠢不合适的，行动得罪了缅甸政府，印度惹了大麻烦。具体内容请自行观看，有道翻译。

The Folly of India's Hubris in Myanmar
Given the importance of the relationship, a little more humility is in order.
By Vibhanshu Shekhar
June 26, 2015





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The Indian army’s cross-border strike against insurgents over the border with Myanmar has received significant attention over the past few weeks. Lost amidst the debates about the rise of a potential new Indian ‘doctrine’ and endless details about the operation itself has been the effect that such incidents – as well as the posturing that results from them – can have on the relationship between New Delhi and Naypyidaw. Indeed, an assessment of the overall Indo-Myanmar relationship suggests the need for greater Indian humility, rather than hubris, in its relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbor.
By focusing too much on the operation itself, some have missed two valuable points. First, India-Myanmar ties have reached a strategic depth. This alignment is based on a new understanding of shifting inter-regional geopolitics and a shared sense of security challenges as a result of years of efforts from both India and Myanmar. While Naypyidaw is incrementally turning away from its most important partner – China – its engagement with India is a strategic gain for the latter and a positive gesture from its ASEAN neighbor. In a display of strategic quid pro quo, Indian assistance to Myanmar against the Kachin has reportedly won Myanmar’s support against the Naga insurgents.
Second, Myanmar is a willing and active partner in this new alignment. Its willingness to put high stakes in its relationship with India should not be seen as rising India’s geopolitical entitlement. The cross-border counter-insurgency collaboration was a sovereign state’s overture for giving strategic depth to bilateral relations rather than a small power giving in to pressure from a great power. India and Myanmar had engaged in similar counter-insurgency collaboration against the ULFA insurgents in 1995 known as ‘Operation Golden Bird.’ India was hardly a rising great power then.
Myanmar’s importance in India’s strategic thinking cannot be overstated. Beyond the generally stable relationship both countries share, Naypyidaw also provides vital strategic space in mainland Southeast Asia and connects India’s Northeast with industrializing ASEAN economies. India has been trying for many years to have access to huge energy resources in Myanmar. In fact, the cross-border collaboration arguably underscores how much New Delhi can achieve if it gets its Myanmar policy right. It also serves as a reminder that any attempt to unravel it may cost New Delhi dearly. For instance, given India’s insurgency problem in the Northeast, another dry spell of two decades may not be advisable.
The recent jubilation actually becomes a matter of ridicule when compared to the long list of incomplete, abandoned and unsuccessful Indian initiatives in Myanmar. India’s limited progress is primarily an outcome of lead-actor inertia and inefficiency, and lost opportunities in building strategic capital in Myanmar. Some of them need to be highlighted here for sobering effect.
First, various cross-border connectivity initiatives have suffered from cost overruns and time lags. It took India eight years to complete a 100-mile Friendship Road and that remains only success so far. Other projects, such as the India-Myanmar Thailand Trilateral Highway, the Delhi-Hanoi railway, and the Kaladan multi-modal project (road and river networks) remain incomplete. Their deadlines have already been pushed back several times. The long-awaited Imphal-Mandalay bus route, proposed for the first time in 2009, could also suffer the same fate. Moreover, India’s own Northeast remains poorly connected with its borders. Indeed, there is only one national highway – NH 39 – that effectively connects India’s Northeast to its border.
Second, notwithstanding two decades of efforts, cross-border trade has not increased. The total trade volume of nearly a million dollars along the border of 1021 miles appears disappointingly low when compared with the bilateral trade of more than $2 billion in 2014. Besides, the poor quality of trade-facilitating infrastructure at the border makes India look like it is stuck in a 20th century time warp.
Third, the saga of India-Myanmar collaboration in the energy sector is well known. India’s failure in securing the marketing rights of oil and gas from Myanmar in 2007 highlighted – aside from China’s growing clout over the decision-makers of Myanmar – New Delhi’s own bureaucratic inefficiency, lack of inter-departmental coordination and its inability to negotiate a deal with Bangladesh. Both India and Myanmar have also abandoned two hydroelectricity projects on the Chindwin River in Myanmar. Myanmar’s rejection of these projects is a reminder that India’s strategic capital in Myanmar cannot be taken for granted.
Fourth, one can notice similar set of lead-actor inertia and challenges in terms of Indian attempts to give momentum to plurilateral cooperative initiatives with Myanmar at the center. India has launched a series of sub-regional, inter-regional, and trilateral cooperative initiatives during the last 18 years. These are BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation) since 1997, MGC (Mekong-Ganga Cooperation) since 2000 and India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Cooperation since 2003. None of them seems to have made a major headway. For instance, though BIMSTEC represents two-fifths of the most impoverished people of the world, it has failed to take any initiative to discuss the current refugee crisis that has unfolded in the Bay of Bengal in May 2015. This is despite the fact that BIMSTEC’s members includes Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand, the three most affected countries in the refugee crisis.
Last but not the least is the plight of the politically disempowered and socially marginalized Indian diaspora in Myanmar. Many of the Muslims caught in the Buddhist-Muslim crossfire in important cities of Myanmar are of Indian origin. Rising India has yet to address the problems of Indian diaspora, notwithstanding the Modi government’s much-vaunted diaspora policy.
Given all this, India would do well to show some humility instead of hubris in its relationship with Myanmar. Demonstrating insensitivity towards its Southeast Asian neighbor through incidents like the cross-border strike is misplaced, unwarranted and strategically offsetting. If India wants to have a better relationship with Myanmar and see its Act East policy succeed, it should start by acting with a little more consideration for Naypyidaw.
Vibhanshu Shekhar is Asia Fellow at East West Center, Washington DC and Adjunct Faculty at ASEAN Studies Center, School of International Service, American University.

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华人之声 发表于 2015-6-28 11:24 AM
虽不怕得罪，但说到毒蛇，还是需要小心才好，躲在暗处不时会出来咬人一口的

嗯，不但要小心，而且如果有机会，一定要打他的七寸。

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严打缅族毒蛇 发表于 2015-6-28 10:35 AM
对于毒蛇缅族，得罪与否又有何干呢？阿三想法是----大洋是阿三的，那么岸边也是阿三的。海盐烧毒蛇很美味的

阿三虽然国力不强，可骨气比一些国家要强。

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独钓寒江 发表于 2015-6-28 08:15 AM
翻译：
印度军队的跨境打击武装分子越过边境与缅甸已经在过去几周中引起相当大的关注。失去了在讨论印度的 ...

谢谢翻译！问好　：）

在野孤鸿

独钓寒江 发表于 2015-6-28 08:15 AM
翻译：
印度军队的跨境打击武装分子越过边境与缅甸已经在过去几周中引起相当大的关注。失去了在讨论印度的 ...

谢谢翻译！问好　：）

华人之声

虽不怕得罪，但说到毒蛇，还是需要小心才好，躲在暗处不时会出来咬人一口的

严打缅族毒蛇

对于毒蛇缅族，得罪与否又有何干呢？阿三想法是----大洋是阿三的，那么岸边也是阿三的。海盐烧毒蛇很美味的

独钓寒江

翻译：
印度军队的跨境打击武装分子越过边境与缅甸已经在过去几周中引起相当大的关注。失去了在讨论印度的崛起,一个潜在的新“主义”和无尽的细节操作本身的效果,这类事件,以及结果的姿态——对新德里和内比之间的关系。事实上,评估整体Indo-Myanmar关系表明需要更多印度谦卑,而不是傲慢,与东南亚邻国的关系。
通过过度关注操作本身,有些人错过了两个价值点。首先,依靠关系达成了战略纵深。这个调整是基于一个新的理解转移区域地缘政治和共享的安全挑战由于多年的努力从印度和缅甸。虽然内逐步放弃最重要的合作伙伴——中国与印度的参与是一个战略获得后者从东盟邻国和积极的姿态。显示的战略交换条件,据报道,印度援助缅甸对克钦赢得缅甸与娜迦族叛乱分子的支持。
第二,缅甸是一个愿意并且积极的合作伙伴在这个新的对齐。愿意把高股份与印度的关系不应被视为崛起的印度的地缘政治权利。跨境反叛乱的协作是一个主权国家的建议给战略深度双边关系而不是小功率屈服于来自一个大国的压力。印度和缅甸有从事类似的反叛乱协作对ULFA叛乱分子在1995年被称为“操作黄金鸟。“印度几乎是一个正在崛起的大国。
缅甸在印度的战略思维的重要性不能被夸大。除了总体稳定两国关系,在东南亚大陆内还提供了重要的战略空间,连接印度与东盟经济体工业化的东北部。印度多年来一直试图在缅甸获得巨大的能源资源。事实上,跨境合作可以说突显出多少新德里如果它得到缅甸政策所能达到的水平。它还提醒人们,任何试图解开它可能让新德里损失惨重。例如,考虑到印度的东北部叛乱问题,另一个两年的干旱可能不是明智的。
最近庆祝实际上成为一种嘲笑的长串不完整相比,废弃的和不成功的印度计划在缅甸。印度的进展有限主要是男主角惯性和效率低下的结果,和失去的机会在构建战略资本在缅甸。他们中的一些人在这里需要强调的效果。
首先,各种跨境连接活动遭受成本超支和时间滞后。印度八年才完成100英里的友谊之路,剩下的只有成功为止。其他项目,如依靠泰国三方公路、Delhi-Hanoi铁路,Kaladan综合项目(道路和河流网络)仍然不完整。他们的截止日期已经推迟好几次了。期待已久的Imphal-Mandalay巴士路线,在2009年首次提出,也可能遭受同样的命运。此外,印度的东北部与边界仍然不佳。事实上,只有一个国家公路- NH 39,有效地连接印度的东北边境。
第二,尽管二十年的努力,跨境贸易并没有增加。的贸易总额近一百万美元的边境1021英里相比低出现令人失望的双边贸易在20亿年超过20亿美元。此外,质量差trade-facilitating在边境基础设施使印度看起来陷入了20世纪时间隧道。
第三,依靠合作的传奇在能源行业是众所周知的。印度的失败在确保石油和天然气的销售权利从2007年的缅甸强调——除了中国日益增长的影响力在缅甸的决策者——新德里的官僚低效,缺乏跨部门协调与孟加拉国,它无法达成一项协议。印度和缅甸也放弃了两个水电项目在缅甸Chindwin河。缅甸的拒绝这些项目是一个提醒人们,在缅甸印度的战略资本不能想当然。
第四,一组可以看到类似的男主角惯性和挑战的印度试图推动多边的合作计划与缅甸的中心。印度发起了一系列的次区域,区域,和三方合作计划在过去的18年。这些BIMSTEC(孟加拉湾多部门行动,技术和经济合作)自1997年以来,德国自2000年以来(Mekong-Ganga合作),India-Myanmar-Thailand自2003年以来三方合作。他们似乎已经取得了重大进展。例如,尽管BIMSTEC代表世界最贫困人口的2/5,它未能采取任何行动来讨论当前的难民危机,展现了2015年5月在孟加拉湾。这是尽管BIMSTEC的成员包括孟加拉国、缅甸和泰国,难民危机影响最大的三个国家。
最后是政治权利缺失的困境在缅甸和印度移民被社会边缘化。许多穆斯林Buddhist-Muslim的交火中被卷入,缅甸是印度裔的重要城市。崛起的印度尚未解决印度移民的问题,尽管莫迪政府声势浩大的移民政策。
考虑到这一切,印度可能会表现出一些谦卑,而不是傲慢与缅甸的关系。展示不敏感性对其东南亚邻国通过跨境罢工等事件是不恰当的,毫无根据的和战略上抵消。如果印度想要更好的与缅甸的关系,看到它的中东政策的行动取得成功,它应该首先表演更多的考虑在内。
华美Vibhanshu Shekhar是亚洲研究员中心,华盛顿特区和东盟研究中心兼职教授们,美利坚大学国际服务学院。
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